Albert Bikbov offers an alternative version of what happened with the Rosneft privatization deal.
Bikbov first reminds his readers that in late 2014 Rosneft got a “loan” from the government of 625 billion rubles. That money was used to purchase foreign currency. But in doing so, the currency market was hit, and the Central Bank had to increase the key interest rate to 17%.
He connects that to the bond placement that Rosneft did last week for nearly the same amount: 600 billion rubles.
“…market participants are convinced that the deal was non-market in character, i.e. it was financed by one or two state banks (presumably “Gazprombank”). In the market it is impossible to quickly raise 0.6 trillion rubles [the placement lasted only 30 minutes -ed]: because the base of Russian investors is limited, the short-term liquidity of Russian banks, and the sanctions [Rosneft cannot borrow from foreign entities under the sanctions].”
What likely happened is that the State provided the money to Gazprombank in a one-time injection of cash, which was then transferred to Rosneft using the bond placement, Bikbov alleges.
But why did Rosneft need that money? Bikbov thinks that the money was a back-up plan in case the deal with Glencore and Qatar did not work out by the 12 December deadline set by the Russian government. The money would then be used as a stopgap until Rosneft could get a deal with another [foreign] purchaser early next year.
But instead “a miracle happened”, and Rosneft was able to announce its deal with Glencore and Qatar at the last minute.
Ignoring the history and morals of Glencore which everyone already knows, he continues, “the main thing is what will happen to the market” as a result of the transactions.
There were two simultaneous deals: the deal with Glencore and Qatar, and the bond placement.
So now Rosneft has an extra 600 billion rubles that it doesn’t really “need”. And the Russian budget has 10.2 billion euros. But the budget doesn’t need euros, it needs rubles “to plug the holes in the budget”. So the government needs to sell the euros and buy rubles (it should get about 688.5 billion rubles for the transaction). But in doing so they would be in a similar situation to what happened two years ago with Rosneft’s purchase of foreign currency, and the market would be destabilized. So instead Rosneft will “buy” the government’s euros with its rubles.
“The most important point: the transaction would have no impact on the market, because it will take place “outside of the market”, which, in turn, means there won’t be any acute fluctuation of the ruble…”
He cites Putin’s meeting with Sechin where this was discussed. He also quotes Alfa Bank’s Natalia Orlova who said:
“I think these deals are not linked. Rubles were purchased for Rosneft’s future liabilities, and Glencore and Qatar Investment Authority’s currency is designed to pay the budget that needs rubles. This is why probably Rosneft will give the rubles, which were borrowed on the domestic market, to the budget and use the currency [euros] to pay its external debt. For this reason, in general, I think that the negative effect for the currency market can be equal to zero. Even if the currency will directly go the budget, anyway, it won’t affect [anything]. If the borrowing through ruble bonds for Rosneft were a backstop deal, it is probable that such bonds can be paid off in advance because bond holders will receive interest.”
And all of that is fine, Bikbov says, but… and it is a big but, now Rosneft has an extra 10.2 billion euros that it doesn’t really need.
“To tell the truth, Rosneft doesn’t need the currency. By the beginning of October, it accumulated $20,2 billion on its accounts. Moreover, Bashneft has about $350 million. In October, Rosneft sold its shares in Vankorneft and Taas-Yuryakh Neftegazodobycha for $4 billion [to an Indian consortium – ed.] and is going to get $1,1 billion for Verkhnechonskneftegaz‘s 20% from Beijing Gas Group. Rosneft needs to pay its external debts equal to at least $4 billion in the 4th quarter. In 2017, Rosneft will have to pay off $12.9 billion in debt. As you can see, the company has currency in surplus even if we don’t consider export transactions in 2017.”
See here for more on Rosneft’s debt.
So what is Rosneft supposed to do with an extra 10.2 billion euros? Just sit on it? Save it for a rainy day? They could buy foreign assets, but that’s a risk because of the sanctions, Bikbov asserts.
Rosneft doesn’t seem to have such qualms, and is buying stakes in foreign projects. See for example, the recent $12-13 billion deal with Essar in India, and the purchase of a 30% stake in Eni’s project in Egypt, among others.
However, Bikbov suggests that Rosneft’s next acquisition may be Tatneft (Russia’s sixth largest oil company).
“…Tatneft is quite attractive as a company, the oil price is still low, and the Russian stock market is very far from world levels.”
He points out that the nearly 20% stake in Rosneft went for $11 billion, which means that Rosneft is worth only $56 billion, according to the market.
“And this is despite the fact that just a few years ago, Rosneft bought TNK-BP for about the same amount of money. And for Bashneft they paid about $5 billion. That is, not including Rosneft, about $60 billion was paid for Bashneft and TNK-BP which is more than all of yesterday’s assessment of Rosneft.”
Nevertheless, he says, the point is that Rosneft has extra cash and what do they plan to do with it?
“Putin has warned Rosneft about a converting “rubles from bonds in the budget currency”. But what about the reverse conversion (Rosneft’s euros into rubles) he said nothing, leaving everything to the discretion of Rosneft. So we can only pray and hope that Rosneft will not collapse the currency market…. Hope for the prudence of Igor Sechin, although 2 years ago Rosneft caused the collapse of the ruble roughly in the same amounts, absolutely regardless of the consequences for the market.”
And meanwhile Tatneft is looking quite attractive.
“In the past month the stock price has increased by 26%, which strongly hints about the interest in it. It would be appropriate to think about this. It would be good if it is not Rosneft…”