A few words as an epitaph to “Russia’s largest bank”…
What amazes me is the flock of white-collar capelin with their “the Central Bank is doing everything right, now the banking system is saved.” They all talk about it as if we live in Britain, and Otkritie is the Royal Bank of Scotland. No, we are not in Britain, and Otkritie is not the Royal Bank of Scotland. As a result of the nationalization of Otkritie, the share of state banks in the assets of the banking system will officially exceed 60%, for which I congratulate you all.
There was hope that at least some kind of competition to the undivided dominance of state-owned banks would be made by private banks… but this hope, in my opinion, has [now] died quite publicly.
There is a lot that could be said about the motives of these private banks… We really do not have any big private players in the economy – there are only “administrative-private”, which are formally private, but they are allowed to be present in the market as a result of some kind of administrative arrangements. Not surprisingly, they sometimes start an excessively risky game with the absorption of assets, etc. … maybe they are counting on “too big to fail” and that they will be saved at all costs with the taxpayers’ money…
The state-monopoly economy in all its glory.
“The financial recovery [of Otkritie] will take place under a fundamentally new scheme, not run before, the main role of which is played by the Banking Sector Consolidation Fund.”
“Previously, the functions of the provisional administration were performed by the State corporation Deposit Insurance Agency [DIA], whose board of directors consists of [members of] the Central Bank and the government. If a decision was made on rehabilitating [a bank], that is, financial recovery by a private investor [like Otkritie’s role in the “rescue” of Trust Bank], they received a loan from the DIA. A number of these attempts have taken place, but unsuccessfully.”
Meanwhile, the Deposit Insurance Agency [Russia’s version of the FDIC] has been broke for over two years, and has had to resort to borrowing money from the Central Bank to fund its operations.
Thus the need for a new fund, which came into existence earlier this summer.
“In May, a law was passed on the creation of the Banking Sector Consolidation Fund, formed at the expense of the Bank of Russia [i.e. the Central Bank] to finance the rehabilitation of banks as part of measures to prevent their bankruptcy. The law envisages the creation of a Fund from the money of the Central Bank and a management company that will act on behalf of the regulator, including taking measures to prevent bankruptcy and settle obligations of rehabilitated banks, and to invest in their capital. Upon completion of the reorganization, it is planned to sell the banks to a new owner at an open auction held by the Central Bank.”
“The consolidation fund, in fact, is a separate set of accounts on the balance sheet of the Bank of Russia….” Central Bank deputy Vasily Pozdyshev told the media in June. He also said that “the staff” of the new fund would consist of only about 25 individuals.
The Central Bank has always had a special relationship with Otkritie. It was the Central Bank that pumped Otkritie with money – from the reorganization of Trust Bank alone, they received almost 180 billion rubles. And the whole State pumped into this bank more than 330 billion [rubles]. And now they are going to pour more [in].
Compare the funds that are going to save one [bank] so close to the heart of the [Central] Bank, with the volume of State support for small and medium sized businesses in 2017, which generously spent as much as 7.5 billion rubles! Or compare it with the comprehensive measures to revitalize the entire Russian economy (25 million new jobs), for which the [Titov led] Stolypin Club’s “Growth Strategy” [proposal] asks 1.5 trillion [rubles].
We suggested creating a bad debt fund so that the State would not seize the banks, but help them by buying bad debts, removing the burden created by the crisis…. Such a measure helped cope with the 1998 crisis, when the Agency for Restructuring Credit Organizations started operating.
But no, as a result we get another opaque fund – this time for the restoration of banks, we get a new issue of hundreds of billions [of rubles].
And Otkritie has been effectively nationalized, he concludes.
And it is likely that the bank will remain under State control for some time, Novaya Gazeta says:
…the Central Bank has demonstrated that it has other measures in its arsenal, besides licence revocation…. Theoretically, after the financial recovery, Otkritie should be sold to a private investor. But, according to the most optimistic estimates, this will happen in 5-7 years, and who can guess what the [situation in] domestic banking sector will be like then?
In February of last year I started to list the banks that had been shut down (retroactive from 1 January 2016) by Russia’s Central Bank. The idea was to see if they could beat their own record from 2015. Last week the final bank was closed for the year and when tallied the Central Bank did indeed beat their own record from 2015: 97 banks shut their doors in 2016 as compared to the 93 closed by the Central Bank in 2015. To put that in perspective, 32 Russian banks lost their licences in 2013, and 86 in 2014.
In December 2015, Sberbank’s German Gref predicted that 10% of Russian banks would have their licences pulled in 2016. That would have been approximately 70. The Central Bank exceeded that.
Gref said that he supported the revoking of licenses from banks that are involved in “anything other than banking activities,” Interfax reported.
In May this year the Russian news agency Rosbalt reported:
The Central Bank is selling this process as an anti-corruption campaign to clean up the banking sector. There are too many banks, the narrative goes. Thus it is necessary to close the weaker players, many of whom are using their clients’ money to make bad loans to themselves and their cronies, and moving the money offshore. See, for example, billionaire Alexander Lebedev’s version of events here.
Former deputy chairman of Russia’s Central Bank Sergei Aleksashenko wrote in October that the scheme:
“…has already cost over one and a half trillion rubles and, taking into account the interest to be paid, the federal budget is going to have to shell out considerably more than two trillion rubles.”
It does not appear that this process will end anytime soon. In July of 2015, VTB’s Andrei Kostin “…predicted that 500 Russian banks will be shut down over the next 5 years…”
“There are too many banks in Russia now — about 800 institutions. In five years, this number may be reduced by 500, but we could achieve a steady level even with 100 banks,” Kostin said in an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt, according to Interfax.
But the rubles in the economy have at some point reached 2 trillion more because the notes did not stay in the treasury, but went to finance the federal budget deficit. In practice, the money took the form of payments to public procurement, pensions, public sector wages, etc.
The Central Bank’s primary task right now is to keep inflation low. This has been stated quite clearly. But adding 2 trillion rubles to float freely on the market would do the opposite. So, Nechaev says, the Central Bank began “dramatically reducing lending to commercial banks. Basically it affected the most widely used forms of credit – the “weekly repo” operations.”
In the words of the Central Bank chairwoman, the Bank of Russia has consistently reduced the provision of liquidity to the banks in this form. The volume of repo transactions fell from 2.69 trillion rubles in late 2014 to 840 billion rubles at the beginning of 2016 and to 490 billion rubles for mid-February.
But, he says:
Obviously the currency acquired by the Central Bank will eventually be given in some form to the Russian banks and large companies for the settlement of Western loans under the closing capital of Western markets due to sanctions.
The Central Bank is conducting “this elaborate scheme”, Nechaev alleges, for two reasons:
- “…the sale of such significant volumes of currency strengthens the exchange rate, and therefore the Ministry of Finance will receive less of the rubles badly needed to carry out budgetary commitments.”
- “…in buying currency, the “irresponsible” Russian bankers and businessmen could get it out of Russia, where capital is inconvenient.”
And so the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank have made everything comfortably, relaxed and home-like.